Water rights transfers are allowed in México under the National Waters Law (LAN) promulgated in 1992. However, water transfers to date have not been widely used and those that have occurred have done so in small quantities and mainly at the level of the irrigation district (ID). We evaluate water policy in México as it relates to transfers and propose alternatives to current policy along the lines of Howe et al. (Water Resources 22(4), 439 -445, 1986). Howe et al. proposed guidelines for water markets that comply with efficiency and equity. This guideline is the basis for implementing the approach proposed in this paper. Even though this research targets the Conchos basin, which is the most important tributary to the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo system, the analysis contains experiences and examples of water rights transfers of other Mexican regions. The paper focuses on two main aspects: first, a summarized and structured effort characterizing water resources policy in México in terms of involved institutions, legal aspects, stakeholder roles, etc; second, a series of proposals and recommendations oriented to improving the performance of this policy.
Introduction
The Rio Conchos, a tributary to the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo, is subject to the Water Treaty signed between México and the United States in 1944. Historically, the Conchos has delivered 290 million m 3 /year (234,926 ACF), or about 54% of Mexican water deliveries under the binational 1944 Treaty (Treaty). Droughts in the 1950s and 1990s have severely affected México's ability to meet doi: 10.2166/wp.2009.009 Water Policy 11 (2009) [79] [80] [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] q IWA Publishing 2009 the Treaty's water obligations. This has led to serious economic, social and political difficulties between these two countries (Stewart et al., 2004) . Because of the importance of the Conchos to the Rio Grande/ Rio Bravo system, the growing economic, social and political problems facing the region, and the lack of decision support tools for water resources management, Gastélum (2006) developed a system dynamics (SD) model for the Conchos basin. Gastélum's results illustrated that strategies such as improved reservoir operation rules, improved water distribution efficiencies and temporal water rights transfers could improve not only the farmers' crop revenue but also increase water deliveries to the United States as specified by the Treaty (Gastélum, 2006) .
As a result of the inadequate application of government policies, particularly inefficient use of and pollution of water, the recognition of the economic value of water in international forums (the Dublin Principles-International Conference on Water and the Environment, January 1992), and the imbalance between water supply and water demand, México established, in the Law of National Waters (LAN), the instrument of water rights transfers which could be interpreted as the willingness of the Mexican government to promote water markets (Lee & Juravlev, 1998) . The LAN defines the legal aspects related to water resources management and planning in México. Several studies of different Mexican water markets, including the Conchos basin, reveal that most water rights transactions involve leases rather than outright sales and all of them have occurred in the agricultural sector (Kloezen, 1998; Fortis-Hernández & Alhers, 1999) . Most of the water transfers occur at the irrigation module (IM) level between ejidatarios (this name comes from Ejido which was the name given to the land assigned to the people without farms during the 1940s; most of this land was expropriated from landowners with great land extensions). Given that ejidatarios tend to have fewer financial resources than private landowners, the ejidatarios are expected to rent or sell their water rights (Rubiños-Panta et al., 2004) . Considering the potential benefits to be produced by water markets and their limited implementation, the potential for water rights mechanisms to improve the efficiency of water management in the Conchos basin is analysed. We attempt to explain the current status of water markets on the Conchos (institutions, participants, laws and their interrelationships) and, in addition, to identify and propose a series of measures aimed at increasing the performance of markets. We draw upon lessons learned from the application of water transfer mechanisms in other Mexican states and/or river systems, and draw inferences that may be applied to the Conchos. This is required to gain a more complete understanding of the current Mexican policy towards water transfers, and at the same time to enable a more holistic approach to identifying feasible solutions. Consequently, the recommendations of this paper are not only applicable to the Conchos basin, but they are also expected to generate feedback to be considered by decision makers at the basin, state or federal level in México. Dinar et al. (1997) suggested that, given that water resources are finite and water demand is constantly increasing, water must be allocated by considering not only economic efficiency (maximizing total net benefit) but also economic equity (fairness of the welfare distribution among the different participants). The authors analyse four water allocation mechanisms worldwide from the perspective of economic efficiency and equity: marginal cost pricing, public water allocation, water market allocation, and user-based water allocation (Table 1) . Marginal cost pricing allocates water to any user with the ability to pay the marginal cost of delivering the water. If all benefits and costs of the water used are captured within the transaction, then marginal cost pricing can be considered economically efficient. Public water allocation is often carried out by government because water is linked to important economic, social and ecological values and private provision of water resources infrastructure is economically and financially infeasible (CEPAL, 1995; Dinar et al., 1997) . In public water allocation, water rights are typically issued to different users for a beneficial use. Since this public allocation typically does not allow water rights holders to transfer their water rights, water allocation tends to be economically inefficient (Dinar et al., 1997) . If the goal is economic efficiency, many economists and water resources specialists have advocated the implementation of water market mechanisms where water may be transferred to its highest valued use. However, third party effects and externalities such as injury to other users, aquifer depletion and pollution of water may prevent equity in the allocation of this resource if they are not explicitly considered in the water transfer. Finally, the existence of viable collective action institutions such as irrigation districts and well-defined water rights are the key elements required for user-based water allocation to reach efficiency (Meinzen-Dick & Mendoza, 1996; Dinar et al., 1997; Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997) . Dinar et al. (1997) conclude that water allocation mechanisms differ across countries and can range from government control, a mixture of government/water markets, to a complete water market allocation mechanism. These mechanisms can be affected not only by the different institutional and legal frameworks but also for the water resources infrastructure of each country.
Water rights allocation mechanisms

Overview of water resources management in México
Before the creation of the National Commission of Water (CNA) in 1989, the water resources sector in México had always been partitioned across several governmental agencies. The CNA is a decentralized agency under the Secretary of Agriculture, Cattle and Rural Development, which became the foremost water resources authority. In 1994, CNA was transferred to the Secretary of Environment, Natural Resources and Fishing (SEMARNAP, 1996) . That transfer conveys the importance that the federal government is increasingly placing on water resources management and protection of the environment. The CNA reports to a technical council, composed of the holders of several federal governmental secretaries. The council's primary function is to program and coordinate the actions of the federal public administrations that are focused on water resources (SEMARNAP, 1996) . Several countries in Latin America, including México, have already made changes in the legislation and institutions dealing with water resources management. These reforms have closely adhered to recommendations made in world conferences such as the United Nations Water Conference (Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 1977), the International Conference on Water and the Environment: Development Issues for the 21st Century (Dublin, Ireland, January 1992), and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992), to improve water resource management and environmental practices in developed and developing nations (Jouravlev, 2001) .
Although specific details of such reorganizations vary in content and execution from country to country, they have the following common bases: the reduction of the state's role in water resources management and the involvement and participation of the public and private sectors in the decision making process and investment, control, operation and maintenance of infrastructure; the widespread move towards increased self-financing of public services related to water management; the generalized interest in using economic instruments to improve water resources management; and the use of the hydrological basins rather than political boundaries as the physical jurisdiction over which water resources management must be implemented (CEPAL, 1994; Jouravlev, 2001) .
The Mexican Federal Government is taking steps to modernize the water sector with three goals in mind. First, to execute an effective decentralization of CNA, by transferring some functions to state and municipal governments and the organized users (Figure 1 ). Historically, water users and local governments have played a passive role in the management process. CNA's new policies will put water users and local governments in the role of promoting, investing and managing most structural and nonstructural activities, as well as the decision making involved with the water resources management process at the local and state level. For instance, CNA started the infrastructure transfer to irrigation district (ID) users in 1992, and federal programmes such as "Clean water" and "Efficient use of water and technology" have been transferred to the state governments. It is worth noting that the decentralization strategy is risky if users are not willing to take on the responsibility of these new functions or they lack the experience and education to efficiently handle such tasks. However, Hearne (2004) reports the successful transfer in México of the irrigation infrastructure and 95% of the irrigation systems by June 2000. Even institutions such as the World Bank have considered the Mexican water resources management strategy to be viable as an alternative to other developing countries owing to the increased efficiency of resource management and the considerable reduction of capital investment by the federal government (World Bank, 2003) .
Second, the federal government has implemented a new regionalization of the CNA that creates 13 regional water resources management agencies corresponding to water basins rather than to politicaladministrative state limits ( Figure 2 ). These regional agencies are charged with water resources administration and decision making, tasks which had formerly been carried out by CNA's central offices in the past. At the state level, the plans are to create State Water Commissions through the restructuring of the Junta Central de Agua y de Saneamiento (Central Directorate of Water and Sanitation, whose current activities are related to state domestic water users). If well structured and executed, these agencies will work together with the IDs and current municipalities, in charge of the water supply and sewage systems, to work more decisively on the water resources decision-making process and promote the financial participation of the private sector in water resources infrastructure development. Also at the regional level, another important water management institution will be the Basin Councils. In the short term, Basin Councils will be coordinating and reaching agreements among local, state and federal government and users participating in the process of water resources planning in the region. In the long term, they will formulate and execute the programmes and actions related to water management; hold responsibility for the development of water resources infrastructure and for the preservation of the resources of the basin. CNA, through the Basin Councils, will define the conditions under which temporary limitations of water use can be enforced, such as extreme shortage or water overexploitation. It is expected that the consolidation of these water organizations will result in strengthening of the operation of the water rights markets (SEMARNAP, 1996) .
Third, CNA will retain regulation functions such as the administrative control of water rights and all the administrative and legal functions related to the LAN and strategic planning for the water resources sector. It will define national water resources policy, participate in the solution of water conflicts at the international and interregional level, participate in emergency response and operate the National Meteorological Service.
Conchos Basin overview
The Conchos river basin is a tributary to the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo (RGRB) which is shared by México and United States. As a result of the 1944 Treaty, for all tributaries on the US side, each nation receives an equal share of all the unmeasured flows reaching the RGRB between Fort Quitman and the Gulf of México. For Mexican tributaries, two-thirds of the water is assigned to México and the rest of the water to the US with a minimum delivery to the US of 431 million m relationships facing this region. One of the main goals was to understand how water rights leasing/ transfers, including transfers inside IDs and transfers between México and the United States as well as improvement in water distribution efficiencies, could affect economic outcomes in the region. Gastélum (2006) found that temporal water rights transfers produced an increase in net crop revenues of almost US$2 million/year (6% increase) compared with current conditions in the Conchos basin. Considering improved water distribution efficiencies, these transfers increased to US$4.7 million/year (12% increase). When cross-border transfers were considered, total benefits for the Lower Rio Grande Basin (LRGB) were four times greater than current conditions in the Conchos. However, when considering temporal water rights transfers inside the Conchos IDs and improved water distribution efficiencies, the net LRGB water benefits are 2.5 times greater than the benefits generated on the Conchos basin. Howe et al. (1986) proposed six criteria for efficient water markets: flexibility, security, opportunity cost, predictability, public perception that the system is equitable and perception that it is fair. Flexibility in water allocation will allow transfers between uses and locations according to the given economic, cultural and social interests. Security of water rights tenure will provide an incentive to the holder to invest in long-term infrastructure which is essential for water transfers. Opportunity cost must be present through the presence of water prices defined by a competitive market environment that encourages the most beneficial use of water (i.e. for a water market to be useful, trade-offs between uses must be present). Predictability of the outcome of the process in the short term (to ensure that water transfers are effected to minimize transaction costs; Dinar et al., 1997) and long term (to predict the extent of water transfers among users, for instance, from agriculture to cities) is also a required ingredient which guarantees not only the acceptance of this mechanism by the involved users but also encourages investment in infrastructure. Equity must be present in order to adequately compensate for associated externalities such as altered return flows, groundwater levels or water quality, which may be a byproduct of a water transfer. Finally, the mechanism must be politically and socially acceptable such that it reflects the objectives and values of society rather than only the point of view and interests of certain individuals. The above criteria are considered in the following analysis to evaluate the current water rights transfer mechanism in the Conchos basin. This exercise is intended to provide a better understanding of the water market system in México and to help identify elements that may need improvement.
Analysis of the water rights allocation system
Regarding flexibility, the Conchos basin has a water resources infrastructure mainly composed of reservoirs, and a network of distribution channels. This infrastructure comprises seven reservoirs with a combined storage capacity of 5,225 million m 3 (4,232,720 ACF) with the principal purposes of providing irrigation, hydropower and flood control. There is a well-defined network of main and secondary conveyance channels that transport surface water from reservoirs to farms. This infrastructure is also used by groundwater users to convey water from wells to farms. Three IDs (ID005, ID090 and ID103) and several irrigation units (IUs) dispersed along the basin define the irrigation users. IDs and IUs have, respectively, a total irrigated area of 108,562 and 14,509 ha. They consume on average 2536.85 million m 3 /year (2.05 MAF/year) representing 71.08% of the total basin's water user consumption (Gastélum, 2006) . Over the last 20 years, an average of 83,000 ha/year have been cultivated on these three Conchos IDs with a total crop revenue of US$63 million/year (Gastélum, 2006) . There are three crop seasons: fall -winter (October to February), spring-summer (March to September) and "perennial" (all year). Historically, wheat, cotton, peanut and alfalfa have been the most popular crops in the basin and together represent 50% of the total planted area and 30% of the crop revenue, respectively (Gastélum, 2006) .
Until recently, the water resources infrastructure belonged to the federal government (CNA). While CNA maintains control of the "strategic infrastructure" such as dams and levees, they began transferring control of the irrigation ditches and conveyance infrastructure to the IDs in 1992. In order to manage this infrastructure, irrigators have organized two main institutions. One of them is the Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada (Societies of Limited Responsibility) (SLRs), which are in charge of the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the major network channels that allocate water from the dams to "control points" and are fully responsible for delivering water to users through this infrastructure. The other institution is the 'Water Users Associations' (WUAs) or Irrigation Modules (IMs), in charge of the infrastructure located within the IDs. Every year CNA, the SLRs and IMs define all the O&M costs each incurs to manage the infrastructure under its control. From this, the user's irrigation fee, which needs to cover 80 -90% of the O&M costs, is determined. For instance, the ID005's fees for the last three irrigation seasons have averaged US$ 8 -9 per 1,000 m 3 of water delivered to the farmer. These fees represent what is called "IDs' level of financial self-sufficiency" (LFA); however, these fees have collected US$ 700,000, which only covered 62.1% of the established budget. This percentage was below the average national's LFA which was around 75%. Besides the O&M costs, sometimes the LFAs must also consider fees for infrastructure improvement (CNA, 1996) .
Currently, the three IDs have approximately 1,714 km of primary and secondary channels to distribute water to farmers. Sixty-two per cent of this infrastructure is concrete lined and is in good condition (CNA, 1996; Velasco-Velasco, 1996) . Because most of the tertiary channels on individual farmers' plots are unlined and current irrigation involves techniques such as amelgas and surcos (furrows), water distribution efficiencies of approximately 40% are common (Gastélum, 2006) .
If one considers the intra-ID water transfers that are currently allowed by law, it appears that the existing infrastructure allows enough flexibility to move water between users and uses. However, actions that increase the current water allocation efficiency and allow more flexibility for future water transfers should be considered. Five types of action are proposed in this paper. First, an in-depth study of the status of the current infrastructure (channels, drainage, roads, etc.) is necessary to determine what actions need to be taken in the short, medium and long terms. Second, financial incentives should be provided to farmers to introduce new water saving irrigation techniques. Third, since one of the main IDs problem is the lack of water measurements, monitoring networks to systematically measure water deliveries at different points within the IDs are needed. Fourth, programmes will be required to educate farmers in issues related to water rights transfers (objectives, problems, characteristics, etc.). Finally, a specific method, which considers establishing irrigation fees in terms of demanded water rather than a farm's total hectares, needs to be specified as suggested by Palacios-Vélez et al. (2002 ) (Velasco-Velasco, 1996 .
If a more encompassing water trading programme, where water can be transferred across IDs, is to be implemented, several improvements are likely to be required. Since the Rio Conchos would be the main source of water conveyance, a minimization of conveyance losses is necessary. Such improvements would also enable the Mexican Government to comply more effectively with the Treaty during drought conditions (Gastélum, 2006) . It is worth noting here that current rules do not allow IDs to transfer water outside their boundaries; consequently, such transfers may represent political and legal obstacles that would have to be addressed, assuming that such transfers appear to be economically, financially and technically feasible. IUs are another important aspect under these water rights transfers that need to be carefully observed. For many years, IDs were the centre of the Mexican water resources infrastructure development. As a result, IUs were often left out of the water management and planning process. IUs have faced problems such as lack of infrastructure, organization, development, and lack of collection of basic statistical information. The Irrigation Units for Rural Development (URDERAL) programme, created by CNA, is aimed at reversing the current situation facing the IUs (Gastélum, 2006) . Though IUs do not have surface water rights, they have historically consumed surface water coming from upstream agricultural water returns or from downstream reservoir runoff (Vigerstol, 2003; Gastélum, 2006) . Consequently, without careful monitoring of water transfers between IDs, IUs' water consumption could become an obstacle to these water transfers.
Intrasectorial water allocations primarily depend upon the degree of increases in future water consumption of domestic and industrial users, and the current basin's water surplus, which is closer to 146 million m 3 /year (118,273 ACF/year) (that is the additional water available after all the demand has been satisfied) (CNA, 2002) . Even though urban populations will almost double from 2000 to 2050, Kelly (2001) predicts that water consumption will remain similar to the current levels because of investments in conservation and water distribution systems aimed to reduce water losses by 25%. Although industrial water demands are expected to increase by 3% annually over the next decades, they will not represent a significant percentage of the total Conchos water demand. Moreover, CNA projects that agricultural production in the State of Chihuahua will increase by 3% per year assuming adequate water availability (Kelly, 2001) . Consequently, agricultural water demand will continue to be the dominant water use. CNA predicts that water rights transfers from agricultural use to municipalities in some parts of the basin will occur. These water transfers may be handled with the current water resources infrastructure without seriously compromising existing deliveries. For such transfers to take place, cities will have to contribute to support O&M infrastructure costs. One of the main problems is related to the costs of improvement and replacement of water resources infrastructure. As previously stated, current irrigation fees are not adequate to cover those costs. In the past, most of the investments have come from federal funds and international loans, which have become scarcer and have had to compete with other social sectors (Kelly, 2001) . Then, state and water users, with the support of Basin Councils and Water State Commissions, would have to work together to identify the best financial sources, such as a better definition of fees, state or private financing participation.
Security of water rights is perhaps the most important element of a system of efficient water transfers. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution contains the legal basis defining the ownership and jurisdiction by the Mexican government of all groundwater and surface water. Because of the ongoing water resources management improvements, the Mexican Government made a revision of the LAN in 2004. Among the most important revisions: the clear definition of the functions and activities of CNA at both the central and the regional level; and the emphasis that water resources management should be executed at the basin level, where water users play a decisive role in the decision-making process.
Even though the federal government is the owner of ground and surface water, it issues "water rights" to private interests (concessions) and to governmental entities (assignments) such as municipal water supply systems. The length of these permits varies between 5 and 50 years and may be renewed. Domestic uses that do not require the construction of infrastructure do not require permits (Kelly, 2001) . Water rights transfers are allowed by LAN under the following specifications. First, water rights transfers may be total or partial, and temporal or definitive. Second, the change of water right holder is done by registration, and by CNA authorization in the following situations: water rights characteristic infrastructure, possible third party effects or hydrologic and ecological basin modifications, and water rights transmissions separated from land (CNA, 2004) .
The LAN established the Public Registry of Water Rights (REPDA). The main function of REPDA is to record and issue water rights concessions or assignments from CNA to water users. In addition, REPDA is responsible for recording any modification of all permanent or temporal transfers, and any suspension or cessation of water rights (CNA, 2004) . Moreover, REPDA will store, for public inspection, records of basin water availability studies and the list of areas where water use is constrained which are of vital importance for future water rights concessions or assignments (CNA, 2004) . REPDA encourages the water resources management process, gives legal validity and security to water rights holders and will be an essential element in water rights transactions (Hearne & Trava, 1997) . However, because water rights are "not a property" but rather a "right to use water", this may cause insecurity among water users when it comes to investing in infrastructure and to being involved in water rights transfers (Rubiños-Panta et al., 2004) . Nonetheless, the change in management infrastructure transfer has illustrated that local water users are confident not only in managing the water resources infrastructure but also in investing in it despite this "weak" water right definition.
Since surface water is easier to monitor than groundwater, CNA has more control of surface water consumption. For instance, CNA periodically verifies groundwater consumption using meters installed on wells. However, monitoring these meters is a very difficult task given the sheer number of wells in the basin and the small number of CNA personnel in charge of such activities. Surface water allocations are determined annually each October first when CNA's Technical Committee defines the yearly water volume to be released for the Conchos basin's water users from each of the reservoirs. Although the specific reservoir operation rule defining yearly release volumes is not clearly known, domestic users have first priority and are guaranteed two years of continuous water supply when the yearly water releases from reservoirs are defined (Virgestol, 2003; Gastélum, 2006) .
The LAN also specifies that under water scarcity periods such as droughts, CNA is not obliged to deliver the volume specified on the water rights' title. However, CNA cannot prevent water users from consuming groundwater in place of forgone surface water. Because of this lack of management of conjunctive uses, a major management issue for the aquifers in the Conchos region, as it is the case for most of Chihuahua, has been the considerable decrease on aquifer's water levels. With regard to surface water rights, CNA's Technical Committee has complete control over the amount of water to be delivered to the water right holders during water scarcity circumstances. For instance, Hearne & Trava (1997) demonstrate that the ID017 "Lagunera" region, located just south of the Conchos basin, experienced a severe water shortage during the 1995-1996 crop season. This led to a decrease from 113,000 ha to 26,000 ha of irrigated land. CNA, with support of state governors and other political leaders from the IMs, established that only cotton would be irrigated by the assigned water owing to cotton's high requirement for labour. The authors note that CNA's decision, reminiscent of its historic centralized decision-making process, could adversely affect the cropping pattern of high valued crops such as melon and completely undermine water rights transfers. This centralized decision-making process has not been detected on the Conchos' IDs; however, it is true that as in most of the Mexican IDs, The Conchos IDs are required to decrease the amount of crops with high water demands such as corn and cotton during water shortages. In times of shortage, the Conchos IDs, similar to many Mexican IDs, deliver equal amounts of water to farmers rather that prorating it according to farmers' assigned water right volumes (Hearne & Trava, 1997) . For example, in 2004, ID005 authorities agreed to deliver 20,000 m 3 of water per farmer's water right regardless of the amount of water specified in such rights (CNA, 2004) .
One of the remaining challenges for CNA-REPDA on the Conchos basin will be to complete the registration of all water users. CNA has registered 3,850 water rights, which represents 77% of the total yearly used water (Kelly, 2001) .
Another important problem to be addressed is the availability of information on water transfers. Transfers are often not reported to CNA as most users do not know about the reporting requirement and CNA only rarely enforces it.
One implication of this lack of reporting is that CNA records under-represent the true number and scale of water rights transactions. Despite the requirement that most records be accessible to the public, it was not possible to obtain statistical information related to water rights transfers because CNA's personnel are still reluctant to release this information. However, some water users are aware of the benefits of registering water transfers: for instance, once the Ejido Assembly or the private farmers have agreed to the water rights transfer, they go to the CNA to notify and to seek the final authorization. This gives the buyer certainty about the purchase or lease (Fortis-Hernández & Alhers, 1999) .
The idea that water transfers must reflect their true opportunity cost means that all trade-offs from a transaction are reflected in the market price. Most of literature related to Mexican water rights transfers, including the Conchos basin, has shown that both water market and opportunity cost conditions are being met (Hearne & Trava, 1997; Kloezen, 1998; Fortis-Hernández & Alhers, 1999; Rubiños-Panta et al., 2004) . However, some authors mention that there are still situations in México where water transactions do not reflect their full opportunity cost. Fortis-Hernández & Alhers (1999) cited that, even though water rights transfers on the ID107-La Laguna are not faced with any sort of legal or political constraints that obstruct their implementation, a group of farmers with greater financial resources set up the price of water right transfers. This "administrative" price is not an outcome of a market process instead it reflects an upward bias in the opportunity cost of the current use. This situation may be a reflection of what could happen on many of the IDs given the current low profitability of the agriculture sector and the lack of financial access that most farmers, mainly the ejidatarios, have. They are subsisting on government subsidies such as Procampo and Alianza para el Campo (Fortis-Hernández & Alhers, 1999; Palacios-Vélez et al., 2002) . Because of water's characteristics as a social and political good (Young, 1986) , it is important to be cognizant of cases in which a given transfer of water does not reflect its full opportunity cost. The interference from CNA on setting up the crop pattern on ID017-La Laguna or the Hydraulic Committee of the ID011-Alto Rio Lerma defining the price of water transfer are examples of how water transfers may not reflect their true opportunity cost, as it is the possibility that segments of society may be harmed in water transfers without any opportunity to ameliorate that injury in the market (Hearne & Trava, 1997; Rubiños-Panta et al., 2004) .
There are two main issues related to the predictability of water transfers (Howe et al., 1986) . First, transaction costs must be minimized and, second, water rights holders must be informed and have an understanding of the long-term consequences of the intersectoral water rights transfer. Regarding the former, Kloezen (1998) stated that temporary water rights transfers at the ID level do not produce significant transaction costs or externalities. Yet, when implementing water transfers outside IDs, the outcome seems to be less predictable. For example, Hearne & Trava (1997) note that, because the benefits of water rights transfers go directly to the IDs rather than to the farmers, this discourages farmers from promoting transfers and consequently could diminish the feasibility of such transfers. However, if carefully instrumented and promoted among farmers, transfers could be successful if the user receiving the water transfer could compensate the ID by improving its water resource infrastructure. Hearn & Trava (1997) cite the example of the city of Los Angeles and the Imperial Irrigation District of California, where the city received water-use rights and provided financial support to the District to improve its water distribution infrastructure. The authors suggested that, if the terms are not carefully defined and the compromises of intersectoral water transfers are not fulfilled by the involved parties, serious economic social and political problems could arise. In addition, Hearne & Trava (1997) cite the case of Rio San Juan Irrigation providing water to Monterrey city, a prosperous Mexican northern city, from the Cuchillo Reservoir long before the creation of the LAN in 1992. In exchange, this ID would receive treated water from the city, a financial support to improve its water distribution infrastructure, or a combination of both. However, there has been reluctance from the Monterrey City's negotiators to fully compensate the farmers.
Although farmers are somewhat familiar with water transfers, if intersectoral water transfers are to be allowed, public education programmes on the potential benefits and costs of such transfers must be targeted at the general public.
With regard to guaranteeing equity to compensate for externalities, even though externalities are not assumed to be a problem for water transfers inside IDs, a mechanism is needed to account for potential third-party effects, and provide guidelines for amelioration and/or compensation for such effects in the event such impacts occur in the future because of increased water demand, drought, intersectoral water transfer conditions, or an amalgamation of these factors and other unpredictable conditions. Currently, CNA, through the REPDA, is in charge of verifying that any water transfer does not produce third party effects before it is authorized. On this matter, the LAN has not yet considered explicitly the natural interrelationship between groundwater and surface water. If not adequately addressed, this could case serious water resources management problems. For instance, Gastélum (2006) found that, even though improvement in water distribution efficiencies on the Conchos basin could increase agricultural net benefits, groundwater recharge on the ID005 would decrease, since most recharge is a function of agricultural water losses.
There is not enough understanding of the role of CNA-REPDA in the presence of third party effects. According to the LAN, it is the responsibility and the authority of CNA-REPDA to analyse and provide a judgement on any kind of water transfer problem between water users or agencies. However, when problems such as the Cuchillo Reservoir reach high levels of political or social attention due to the magnitude of people involved or the amount of water in dispute, they are solved in the state or federal courts.
Water rights transfers are a feasible solution to address water supply and demand issues in the Conchos basin. They appear to be socially and politically accepted given their long history in the agricultural sector in México which predates the federal ruling on the legality of transfers (Kloezen, 1998; Rubiños-Panta et al., 2004) . Since the creation of the LAN, water transfers have been increasing, leading to more adaptable, equitable and sustainable water resource solutions (Rubiños-Panta et al., 2004) .
Concluding remarks
This paper attempts to increase the understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of economically efficient water markets and apply those concepts to the institutions in the Conchos basin, the state of Chihuahua, and the federal government of México. This analysis will contribute to better comprehend the structure supporting the mechanism of water rights transfers and, more importantly, to identify and create opportunities for its improvement.
Following the six factors proposed by Howe et al. (1986) , we suggest that the institutions and infrastructure found in the Conchos basin provide the basis for a flexible market-based means of allocating water among users. The transfer of water resources infrastructure from the federal government to the IDs and water users has increased water efficiency and local input into water management decisions. However, irrigation users' water fees still do not cover the full cost of providing water and, consequently, they are still receiving federal subsidies for O&M infrastructure costs. In addition, for water transfers to be successful, all involved parties must have trust in the quantities of water to be traded. This requires an adequate network of monitoring devices. Finally, water users and society in general must be educated about the benefits and costs of transfer of water across irrigation districts, and even types of use.
Basin Councils and the State Water Commissions, which are in the process of formation, will be elemental in involving the private sector in water resources infrastructure development and in promoting a new "water culture" oriented towards disseminating knowledge of water issues including water conservation and relaying the importance of managing scarce water resources.
As pointed out, the Mexican government, according to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, is the owner of the water, though it issues water rights (called concessions or assignments in the LAN) which can vary from 5 to 50 years and can be renewed. Also, the LAN establishes that these water rights can be transferred. The REPDA is the key mechanism guaranteeing security to water right holders. Some of the remaining security challenges are to continue registering water users on the REPDA, to increase CNA's enforcement and control, and to make users aware mainly during drought periods of limiting their consumption as established by their corresponding water rights. During drought scenarios, water must be allocated, without CNA's interference, on a pro rata basis according to the volumes specified on the water rights rather than defining the same amount of water for each water user. There are still some circumstances which could preclude the presence of opportunity cost of water transfers inside IDs such as water transfer prices being defined by a group of farmers with higher financial capacities, the generalized view of water as a social and political good, or the interference of local authorities to set up water prices among water users. In relation to the water equity condition, water transaction costs and externalities are not a problem for temporal water right transfers inside IDs. Yet, when defining outside water transfers, the benefits for the IDs and farmers must be carefully verified. Also, even though intersectoral water transfers could significantly improve water use efficiency, they could generate a series of economic and social problems when buyers and sellers do not comply with the established agreements such as the El Cuchillo Reservoir experience. Finally, because water transfers have been occurring even before the LAN contemplated them, it is a positive signal of their social and political acceptance.
